SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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??–???
2000
[H.A.S.C.
No. 106–59]
TERRORISM AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON
TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND
SESSION
HEARING HELD
JULY 13, 2000
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SPECIAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL ON TERRORISM
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey,
Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
CURT WELDON,
Pennsylvania
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT,
Maryland
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES,
North Carolina
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
FLOYD D. SPENCE, ex officio,
South Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JAMES
H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT E. ANDREWS,
New Jersey
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
IKE SKELTON,
ex officio, Missouri
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Robert
S. Rangel, Staff Director
David Trachtenberg, Professional
Staff Member
Lisa Wetzel, Staff
Assistant
(ii)
C O N T E N T
S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2000
HEARING:
Thursday, July 13, 2000, Terrorism and
Threats to U.S. Interests in the Middle East
APPENDIX:
Thursday, July 13, 2000
THURSDAY,
JULY 13, 2000
TERRORISM AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
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STATEMENTS
PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Saxton, Hon.
Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on
Terrorism
Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from
Arkansas, Ranking Member, Special Oversight Panel on
Terrorism
WITNESSES
Kayyem, Juliette N.,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Former Commissioner,
National Commission on Terrorism
Merari, Dr.
Ariel, Senior Fellow, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Director, Political
Violence Research Unit, Tel Aviv
University
Perlmutter, Dr. Amos, Professor of
Political Science, American University, Washington,
D.C.
APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
[The Prepared
Statements can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Kayyem, Juliette N.
Merari,
Dr. Ariel
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Perlmutter,
Dr. Amos
Saxton, Hon. Jim
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD:
[The Documents submitted for the Record are
pending.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Questions and Answers submitted for the
Record.]
TERRORISM AND THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed
Services,
Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism,
Washington, DC, Thursday,
July 13, 2000.
The Panel met, pursuant to call,
at 10:10 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton
(Chairman of the Panel) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON
TERRORISM
Mr. SAXTON. Good morning.
The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive
testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle
East. This open hearing follows a closed briefing we received on Tuesday from
the Intelligence Community exploring the same topic. It has been the Terrorism
Panel's practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts,
to pair classified briefings and open briefings and open hearings on the same
topic in the same week.
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This
way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer
and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and
other institutions. Comparing and contrasting the views of the Intelligence
Community and independent scholars, learning areas of agreement and
disagreement, is I think an excellent way of educating
ourselves.
The functional and regional approach
that the Terrorism Panel is taking in these hearings to study terrorism is also
working well. It enables us to focus and explore in depth the subject matter. So
far, we have had terrorism hearings on weapons of mass destruction and Latin
America. Our plan is to continue having hearings on a region-by-region basis.
For example, future hearings will look at terrorism in South Asia and Central
Asia.
Eventually, Terrorism Panel hearings will
have examined terrorist movements around the entire globe. Our objective is to
understand both the unique and the particulars of terrorism in each region, as
well as overall commonalities and trends in global terrorism that may be useful
in helping us assess the threat in the future. So far, the Terrorism Panel has
managed to sustain a very ambitious schedule of classified Intelligence
Community briefings and open hearings.
Since our
first hearing in late-May, we have done in weeks what a subcommittee or panel
would normally require months to accomplish. Six full panel events in a little
over a month is a lot of ground covered in a relatively short period of time.
Let us hope that we can sustain this momentum. Today, we turn our attention to
terrorism in the Middle East. To many scholars, and certainly in the most
popular imagination, the Middle East is the central locus of modern
terrorism.
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There
are some good reasons for this thinking. Five of seven nations listed by the
Department of State as sponsors of terrorism are located in the Middle East.
Most of the U.S. casualties suffered from terrorist attacks have been inflicted
by terror groups operating in the Middle East, and certainly Middle Eastern
terrorist groups seem better than terrorists in other regions at getting
themselves into international newspaper
headlines.
For example, just recently, on July 5,
terrorists tried hijacking an airliner in Jordan and terrorist threats led the
U.S. State Department to cancel 4th of July celebrations in Amman. Middle
Eastern terrorism also appears to be on the leading edge of the terrorist
phenomenon. New trends in terrorism often seem to originate in the Middle East.
International terrorism, for example, appears to have evolved from Middle
Eastern terrorist groups who began focusing on a local or regional problem, but
who expanded their goals and operations to the world
stage.
Hezbollah, for example, is based in the
Middle East, but has carried out serious attacks in South America. As a further
example, the relatively new terrorist group, Al Qaida, headed by Usama Bin
Ladin, may foreshadow a new trend toward relatively self-sufficient terrorist
organizations that sustain themselves and operate independently of a state
sponsor.
Finally, given the ongoing proliferation
of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, I think it would
surprise no one if the world's first terrorists armed with a nuclear missile
appeared there. But there are also benign trends in the Middle East that could
mitigate or even profoundly alter the future terrorist threat. There are some
signs that Middle Eastern governments are becoming less sympathetic and less
tolerant of terrorism. This is good news.
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Just
recently, on July 3rd, the Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament called for greater
cooperation among Muslim nations in the fight against terrorism. Reformist
movements in Iran, and Israel's attempt to find a political solution to the
problem of the Palestinians, could conceivably deprive key terrorist groups of
the chief rationalizations for their existence. Even Libya, which in times past
behaved as if its sponsorship of terrorism was a badge of honor, has been
attempting to distance itself from the use of
terrorism.
We have with us today a distinguished
panel of independent experts to address terrorism in the Middle East. Dr. Ariel
Merari from Harvard University is a leading scholar on the phenomenon of
terrorist suicide attacks and the deterrence of terrorism in the Middle East
context. Dr. Amos Perlmutter of American University has written and lectured
extensively on security issues in the Middle East and the role of
terrorism.
Ms. Juliette Kayyem from Harvard
University is well known to all of us, and she has served on the National
Commission on Terrorism and, in addition to other issues, I understand she will
offer some important cautionary advice, that we should all heed, about avoiding
stereotyping and being careful not to confuse the term terrorist with Arabs or
Islam, a point that I have made over and over again
myself.
So it is a well-balanced panel before us
today, having a broad but complimentary expertise, prepared to discuss the
psychology, the political and strategic goals and methods, and the particulars
of specific terrorist movements. I want to thank all of you for being here and
before we move forward, I would like to turn the microphone over to Mr. Snyder,
the Ranking Member.
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[The
prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix.]
STATEMENT
OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, RANKING MEMBER, SPECIAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL ON TERRORISM
Mr.
SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the panel and
questions.
Mr. SAXTON. Sir, you may
begin. Thank you very much for being here. We appreciate it and we are anxious
to hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. ARIEL MERARI, PH.D., SENIOR
FELLOW, THE BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, KENNEDY SCHOOL
OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND DIRECTOR, POLITICAL VIOLENCE RESEARCH
UNIT, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
Dr. MERARI.
Thank you very much, Your Honor. I really see it as a great honor to be here and
speak to you today. In my testimony, I would like to focus on the phenomenon of
suicide terrorism. Although, if you wish, I can later answer questions on other
aspects of Middle Eastern terrorism as well. Suicide terrorism is of particular
importance in my view because it has a very significant political and strategic
results quite often.
We all remember the impact
of suicide terrorist attacks on the Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1983–84. A
series of suicide attacks by Islamic groups in that case resulted in the
decision of the states that contributed their armed forces to the Multinational
Force, namely, the United States, France and Italy, to decide to withdraw from
that country and that was certainly a move that has far-reaching political and
strategic consequences with regard to Lebanon and the Middle Eastern arena.
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In
Israel it was the late Prime Minister Rabin who termed suicide terrorist attacks
a strategic problem and for a good reason as a series of suicide terrorist
attacks carried out by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad resulted in a change of
government in Israel and a slow down, almost a halt of the peace process, and I
think this kind of development, political development, is a result of terrorism
of this kind we can also see in the future.
It is
very important, I think, that we understand what motivates people to carry out
suicide terrorist attacks and how suicide terrorist attacks are being prepared.
It is, I think, commonly believed by commentators and also by some academics
that suicide terrorists are mainly motivated by religious ideology, religious
belief. Many have claimed that people carry out suicide attacks because they are
convinced that if they do so they will get a good place in
Paradise.
However, not many studies, empirical
studies, have been done on suicide terrorists, and as I have carried out
studies, empirical studies, of suicide terrorists, I would like to share with
you the main results, which are quite different from the common belief. First of
all, I think to put it in a nutshell, suicide terrorism is an organizational
phenomenon. This is most important to
understand.
In the whole series of Lebanese
suicide terrorist attacks and Palestinian suicide terrorist attacks or the
suicide terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka or the Kurdish Kurdistan Worker's Party
(PKK) suicide terrorist attacks, there was no single case in which an individual
on his own prepared this attack and carried it out. In all cases, it was an
organization that decided to use this tactic, found the person or persons to
carry it out, trained them, and sent them on the mission at the time and place
that the organization chose.
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This
is very important to understand. People don't carry out this kind of attack on
their own whim, on their own decision, on their own logistical preparations.
Organizations that have done so, and several organizations have used it as a
more or less, I think, common tactic, have done so at times that they viewed as
critical, crucial in terms of political
agenda.
For instance, Hamas started carrying out
terrorist attacks in Israel at the time that the peace process was launched.
There may be one exception to that in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers have carried
out routinely more or less various suicide terrorist attacks. But in other cases
the organizations involved resorted to this tactic when they thought that the
time was critical, that they were at political strategic
crossroads.
A second important point is that
religious motivation is not a must for carrying out suicide terrorist attacks. A
very, I think, convincing case in point is Lebanon. Everybody, or almost
everybody, believes that in Lebanon suicide terrorist attacks have been carried
out by Islamic organizations merely by Hezbollah. This is true to some
extent.
However, the majority, almost two-thirds
of the terrorist attack suicides, terrorist attacks in Lebanon, have been
carried out by secular organizations, by Syrian organizations, primarily Syrian
Bath, Lebanese Bath, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. They carried out
the majority of the suicide terrorist attacks. Hezbollah has carried out only
slightly more than one-third of the suicide terrorist attacks, but they were the
first and therefore they got most of the notoriety for it.
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In
Sri Lanka the Tamil Tigers are Hindus and they don't act out of religious
motivation. They are motivated by Nationalist sentiments. The Kurdish PKK, the
Kurdish Labor Party, is a Marxist party. They are certainly not religious. And
they have also carried out suicide terrorist attacks. Religiosity and religious
motivation, and the belief in Paradise are not a must. Actually, in many cases
terrorists have carried out suicide attacks out of Nationalist motivation or in
the name at least of Nationalist motivation, patriotic motivation as they see
it, or any other motivating force that is
non-religious.
A third important point that I
would like to emphasize is that in carrying out suicide attacks, an organization
makes use of people who are willing to die to begin with. If you look at the
process of recruiting and training used by various organizations that have
resorted to suicide terrorist tactics. The common method is that the
organization recruits people who are express a willingness to commit suicide.
Usually they don't put it in these words. They don't say commit suicide, but die
for the cause or a similar term or in the case of Palestinians, for instance,
carry out an act of (INAUDIBLE) in Arabic,
martyrdom.
The organization by its recruiting
mechanisms, agents, association as is the case of Hamas or the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, for instance, or in the neighborhood or in the college or just on
the basis of personal friendship the organization identifies persons who express
their willingness to carry out these kinds of attacks. Once the organization,
people responsible in the organization, are convinced that the person is serious
they put them usually in a training process that may last in most cases from
weeks to months.
This training process involves
two important elements. One element is strengthening the already existing
willingness to die by giving that person additional reasons, strengthening his
reasons, to die by giving him additional ideological stories such as national
glory, hatred for the enemy, etc., etc. In this part of the training, religious
motivation also comes to play if the organization is a religious one.
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So
for religious organizations in this phase of the training that consists of
strengthening the motivation to carry out these acts of martyrdom or suicide, as
you prefer to call it, the organizations involved usually don't call it suicide,
but in this phase of training if the organization is religious the trainer also
speaks about the religious justification for this kind of act, about Paradise,
about the right or actually the need to carry out an act like that in the name
of God, in the name of religion.
The other
element, critical element, in this training process is the creation of a point
of no return. This is very important because the wish to die is not stable.
Nobody is 100% suicidal and still alive, of course so that a person may change
his or her mind in the process. In the Palestinians case it is only his mind.
Other organizations it is also ''her'' sometimes. In order to make sure that the
person does not change his mind, the organization makes points of no
return.
These are achieved by making the
candidate to write last letters to his family, to his friends. The person, the
candidate, is being videotaped saying farewell, and from that point on the
person in the case of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
person is actually referred to in Arabic as al-shahid al-hai, which means the
living martyr. The living martyr, meaning that he is already dead. He is only
temporarily here with us.
Under such
circumstances after this phase it is very, very hard for persons to change their
mind. And actually there have been practically no case of mind changing by
suicide candidates in the case of Palestinians, very, very few in the case of
the Tamils, as much as a very few cases in the case of Lebanese organizations.
Although this training process is not necessarily identical, the Tamil Tigers in
the different system are working more in military type units.
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In
this sense, they are more similar to the Japanese to the preparation of the
Japanese Kamikazes in the Second World War. The Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and
the Lebanese organizations are underground organizations that they don't control
their own territory and therefore they have to prepare their suicides in a more
clandestine individual listing way rather than en masse as the Tamil Tigers
do.
I would like to just conclude by a very brief
statement concerning what can be done about the phenomenon which is rather
important. I think experience shows that one can effectively defend selected
potential targets against suicide attacks, such as government buildings,
military installations. These can be effectively defended by relatively simple
procedures.
In Lebanon, for instance, suicide
attacks against Israeli targets dropped very, very significantly after 1986,
actually after 1985, because measures adopted by the Israeli Defense Forces,
IDF, proved effective in preventing most of the suicide attacks so that the rate
of successful attacks dropped very, very significantly, which led the
organizations involved in perpetrating these attacks to decide that they should
stop because it is simply not bringing any
results.
And they made it clear in their
statements that this was the reason. So technical, procedural measures can be
quite effective in preventing suicide bombing attacks on selected potential
targets. However, it is very difficult to prevent suicide attacks against the
public at large. If an organization is determined to carry out a suicide attack
against a random public, this is very hard to prevent. Of course, the most
important aspect in preventing attempts is intelligence. Intelligence is
critical, of course.
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And
indeed Israel has been quite successful in preventing some attacks on the basis
of good intelligence work. However, intelligence is not perfect. Not always it
comes in time, not always it is available. Some of these organizations are
rather clandestine, very hard to penetrate, and therefore, one cannot rely on
intelligence as being an absolute preventive
measure.
I would say that politically and
strategically in trying to prevent suicide attacks it is very important to
address the population which gives rise to the suicides and to the
organizations. Take the Palestinian organizations as a case in point. Hamas is a
popular organization. Hamas is very mindful of Palestinian public opinion. For a
period in the early time of the Oslo process, peace process, Hamas refrained
from carrying out spectacular attacks, including suicide attacks, for the
express reason that they felt the Palestinian public would not support it, that
it would be counter-productive for the
organization.
Palestinian public opinion
concerning suicide attacks has waxed and waned. The lowest level of support has
been 20% in March, 1996, 20% of the Palestinian population in very reliable
public opinion polls said that they supported attacks. It has risen since that
time gradually. It is now somewhere about 40% support. Therefore, political and
educational work on the public opinion of the suicide bombing organizations is
very, very important.
Strategically and
politically, I think this is the most important element. Most organizations that
carry out these attacks are large popularly based and they are very, very
mindful of their constituency's opinion. And I think this is politically the
most important arena. Well, I will stop at this point, and of course I am
willing to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.
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[The
prepared statement of Dr. Merari can be found in the
Appendix.]
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very
much. I must say that your testimony was very, very interesting. In the many
years that I have been dealing with as a student this subject, I must say that I
haven't heard words and the message that you have just delivered to us is very
interesting and important. Thank you very much. We will have some questions. Dr.
Perlmutter.
STATEMENT OF DR. AMOS PERLMUTTER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Dr.
PERLMUTTER. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure and honor. And allow me
to read because as a professor, I am sidetracked, so if I can read from my paper
you can assure that I will be on time. I have been asked and I am going to
discuss the general nature and structure of terrorism with an emphasis on the
Middle East. It is an old phenomenon, in fact seven years ago the Encyclopaedia
of the Social Sciences has written what 100 scholars have repeated without
looking back and that is what they
defined.
Terrorism is a term used to describe the
method or theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to
achieve its avowed aims chiefly through systematic use of violence. Terroristic
attacks are directed against persons who as individuals, agents or
representatives of authority interfere with the consummation of the objectives
of such groups. Destruction of property and machinery or the devastation of land
may in specific cases be regarded as additional forms of terroristic activities,
constituting variations of agrarian, industrial, and economic terrorism as a
supplement to a general program of political terrorism.
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This
definition, seventy years ago, is just as valuable with some amendments into new
tactics and strategies of terrorist organizations. Terrorist movements are
political organizations that employ terror and violence as a means to achieve
specific goals. Modern terrorism is a byproduct and an instrument of modern
radical nationalist movements. I say again radical because we are not talking
about Islam, we are talking about radical Islam, radical terrorist groups,
radical forces, sometimes in the majority, sometimes in the
minority.
Terrorism and terrorist movements are
employed to achieve radical gains that could not be achieved by diplomacy or
traditional political bargaining. Some nationalist movements and states employ
terrorism as an auxiliary instrument to maximize their political goals.
Terrorism is used in different forms in different places, but for one principle,
to destroy or to inflict serious injuries on a foreign power or an oppressive
regime.
From the nineteenth century on, terrorism
has been employed by agrarian radicals in Russia and Spain, by Lenin and his
cohorts to seize power, and by Hitlerian methods to intimidate the opposition
parties, Social Democratic, Liberals, Conservatives, and others. In the modern
Middle East practically all Arab, Islamic, nationalist, and radical movements
have employed in one form or another terrorism to achieve independence which is
important for their purposes from colonial and foreign
power.
You take, for instance, the case of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that was established in the 1920s and early 1930s.
It was designed to harass and terrorize the British Suez Canal Company, its
administrators—the target was the administrators as well as the monarchy. While
most nationalist movements in the Middle East were organized by political
parties, terrorism as an instrument of nationalist movements in the Arab Middle
East has been most pronounced.
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There
were also Jewish terrorists that fought the British Mandatory, Etzel, Stern Gang
Lehi, but they were marginal to the Zionist nationalist movements. We must
distinguish between the military employment of nationalist movements and
terrorist movements. The major goal of nationalist movements is to assume power
after harassing colonial and foreign rule. But their political movements
dominate their military organizations. Terrorist groups could have become the
exclusive representation in the case of the Palestinian nationalist movement, as
we have known from the days of Haj Amin al-Husseini to the days by which the
terrorist group becomes the center of the
organization.
The Palestinians are predominant
today in all terrorist groups in the Middle East, in South Asia, and in the
Persian Gulf. The present Islamic terrorism is based upon radical Islamic
terrorism and on the whole is not sponsored by states. In fact, Islamic radical
terrorist groups in Egypt are combating the Egyptian state, the Jordanian
Islamic radicals are combating the monarchy, the Algerian radical Muslims are
combating the Algerian state, and the Hamas Islamic radicals are combating the
Palestinian Authority when they feel that it is
necessary.
The next aspect is terrorism as an
instrument of radical Arab states and movements. The radical Arab states in the
Middle East, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Iran are authoritarian radical states that
employ terrorism to achieve foreign policy goals. The targets of all are what
they call imperialists or Zionists, however the major targets are the United
States and Israel, there is no question about it, to these radical Arab states.
The Arab equivalent for the term imperialism is called al-Istimar, the devil,
al-Istikhrab, the destroyer.
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In
their ideology, which I will discuss later, radical states and movements, the
United States is the devil incarnate and represents the target of all hatreds.
Syria. Another type of terrorism is the state supported terrorism. With state
supported terrorism there are different levels and roles in which the patron
state either uses or aids or abates or provides asylum for terrorists. Syria is
an excellent example. There are several types of terrorists that operate from
Damascus. All are under the supervision of the Assad family, of the intelligence
services, and the military services. They don't operate
independently.
However, there are terrorists that
are used as an instrument of Syrian foreign policy which are autonomous in the
case of the Hezbollah. It is a social and political movement that has a life of
its own, emphasis of its own, but it has been used both by Iran and Syria to a
certain extent for its own purposes but it is an independent political and
military organization. Other terrorists like Palestinians, Kurds, Afghans, and
Chechens can be activated or silenced at the regime's
pleasure.
Their offices are opened and closed at
the whim of the regime. Another serious difference between Hezbollah and other
terrorists is that the former are not trained or equipped by the Syrian regime,
nor are they dependent on Syrian intelligence services budget. They depend upon
the regime only for transporting weapons and monies from Iran for their own
purposes. Iran, of course, is the revolutionary Shiite theocracy, and like the
Soviet Union there are similarities in terms of
goals.
It is a mission-oriented state. While
Syria employs terrorists to enhance foreign policy, the Iranian regime has taken
it upon itself the missionary role of recreating of mini theocracies or
dependent groups in the Middle East. Iranian terrorism in the Persian Gulf,
Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon is more than an extension of Iranian foreign policy.
Its support of terrorism is concomitant of its policies of conversion, the
destruction of secular Arab and Muslim regimes in the Gulf and the Middle East,
and the hope for the creation of Iranian hegemony in the Gulf. It is both a
combination of nationalism and Shiites radicalism.
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What
is the environment? Terrorist organizations and movements operate in an unstable
political, social, and economic environment. Like a swarm of insects, they
operate in the dust of economically deprived areas, where they control the
population and emerge to cripple the regime with their poisonous sting. They
come in different social forms, either as a protest movement, or an ideological
movement.
Terrorism thrives, like cancer, in weak
and unhealthy environments, and on the whole it is found in non-democratic,
ineffective authoritarian, praetorian, and kleptocratic systems and states, and
in state supported authoritarian regimes of Syria, Libya and Iraq. Their targets
are often ''corrupt'' regimes, but there are also nationalist movements that are
operated in democratic states, the Irish, the Walloons, the neo-Nazi skinheads
in Germany, and the militias in the United
States.
They produce various mutations with
varying life spans. They come and go depending on the cohesiveness of their
leadership. Many mutations do not survive. Their leaders are either assassinated
by the regime's security services or through fratricide, or desertion and
betrayal. Many terrorists are killed by their own brothers of their own
organization for purposes of one section or faction or another. Most of the
above involve violence and bloodshed. Islamic terrorism or radical Islam
terrorism is advanced by penetrating into Islamic communities in the United
States and Europe.
Under the cover of the
so-called welfare organizations, they secure financial help, military training,
and political power. In a very specific case, the CIA that trained Islamic
radicals against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, is responsible for the more
violent and vicious terrorists than in the Middle East and in South Asia. This
is of course the Bin Ladin organization, which is a product of our training of
these particular individuals in the war against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.
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I
come to the last point, which is important, ideology and organization. There is
so much talk about Islamic. In my view, the nature of the organization and
ideology is flexible and not necessarily what scholars are analyzing and
studying, what do they say, what do they think. Hamas yesterday were Marxist,
today they are fundamentalists. All of them are Palestinian Arab nationalists.
All are nationalists whether they use religion or Marxism as an instrument of
mobilization of forces as an ideological
structure.
Nevertheless, some Islamic radicals
are not even familiar with the Koran. Many of them are graduates of European
universities and Marxist organizations. They speak about Jihad. I don't think
that they have any philosophical or intellectual knowledge, for instance, the
Islamic forces in Egypt or in the Muslim brotherhood which is a (inaudible)
Islamic radical group. So we should be wary about the idea of
religion.
And in the Middle East religion and
politics interchange, and therefore, it is not difficult to move from one sphere
to another. I am not interested personally in what my professors and colleagues
are studying, what do they really mean by that, is it Kant or Marx or Lenin or
Mao. What counts in the end is what they do and these are forces of action,
these are people of action. They are not intellectuals. Although most of the
writers are scribblers, journalists, intellectuals. Most of them are Western
trained and educated. Most of them are professionals, doctors, engineers,
especially teachers. These are not your no backbone, anti-(inaudible) people.
These are people who have been trained in American and European universities or
in modern universities in the Middle East.
The
scribblers that have written what I call the gobbly gook of the organization,
and I have done on my computer—I took about 20 different languages of
organizations and found that I can myself tomorrow proclaim Marxist Islamic
ideology group from all the mish-mash that I have read is the essence of the
organization. Now it is not all of them. George Habash is a Marxist and a
Palestinian.
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The
survival of the organizations depends upon clandestinity, security, and the
threat from apostasy. The survival of the organization again depends on its
ideological ability to persuade, to mobilize, and to sustain itself, and above
all upon leadership. Leadership is fundamental and without leadership it cannot
exist. One of the measures to penetrate these organizations is to play between
the different fratricidal groups. Many of them recant, desert, are exiled, or
self-exiled or move.
So in conclusion I would
want to say that it is a universal phenomena. It is nothing new. Since the
French Revolution, we have more and more of it. The Russia Revolution has
enhanced the idea of terrorism. The purposes, organization, and ideology of
terrorism are universal. Not in the sense that Marxism and Islam are truly
different ideologies, but the exploitation of ideology is a major tactic for
sustaining the organization. In one form or another, all terrorist movements are
fratricidal, authoritarian, ruthless, and clandestine. There is no moderate
group among them. It is an oxymoron.
[The
prepared statement of Dr. Perlmutter can be found in the
Appendix.]
Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Perlmutter,
thank you very much for very articulate testimony. Ms. Kayyem.
STATEMENT
OF JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, FORMER
COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM
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Ms.
KAYYEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me here
today.
Mr. SAXTON. We are honored
that you came.
Ms. KAYYEM. Thank you.
It is humbling to be here at this table with Mr. Merari and Dr. Perlmutter. I
want to—since it has been covered so well, I want to quickly just go over the
nature of terrorism and then get to what that means for lawmakers and policy
makers in terms of our current approach. I am a lawyer and used to be at the
Department of Justice so that is how I came into the terrorism field. I am just
going to quickly reiterate some of the things that, and some of the things, Mr.
Chairman, that you opened with, the nature of terrorism in the Middle East is
obviously changing as we see significant changes in both the state structure and
the structure of terrorist organizations.
We have
changes that are too early to call in Syria and Iran and Jordan certainly, new,
young leadership that in terms of their state sponsorship of terrorism may
change over time, and we have to be prepared for that and be open to it. As you
said, it is a good thing. We have a lot—the untold story of terrorism in the
Middle East is that we have a lot of friends in the Arab Middle East who are
helping us as we saw in the Millennium crisis that
occurred.
The second issue regarding now
terrorist groups is the potential, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, or their desire
to acquire weapons of mass destruction. I personally believe that the emphasis
on it in the academy and in government probably belies the reality of it to a
certain extent. It is still quite difficult to acquire and mass produce a weapon
of mass destruction. It doesn't mean we should ignore the potential but it does
mean that guns and fertilizer also go a very long way, and we should remember
that in terms of our intelligence and preventive measures regarding
terrorism.
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What
I do think it means especially with groups in the Middle East and fanatical
Islamic groups is that we also need to go a long way in terms of assuring that
we, as a country that has access to biological and chemical agents, have a lot
more controls regarding the use and dissemination of agents of mass destruction,
weaponry that can be used for mass distribution. Finally, in terms of the
terrorist structure, the changes that have been occurring within terrorist
groups over the last 10 or 15 years are significant for us as—for policy makers
and people who pass laws.
The structure of
terrorist groups, as was stated by the two other witnesses, is fluid. It is
constantly changing. It is, in my opinion in my work on the commission, probably
less hierarchical than it used to be. The Internet is used. Country borders
don't exist anymore now that you have the Internet and sort of free flow of
people including this country, and so we have to remember that in terms of how
are we thinking about the best way to protect ourselves and our interests and
the Middle East peace process and our allies like
Israel.
When you opened, Mr. Chairman, you did
say I think that the Middle East—I think when most Americans think about
terrorism they think about Arab terrorism. I think that the aftermath of what
happened in Oklahoma City is a testament to that, that it wasn't just the news
agencies but also people within the Department of Justice who were focusing
their attention on the possibility that it was Islamic or Arab groups and there
were a number of arrests in the wake of that before we caught Tim
McVeigh.
I think that is unfortunate for a number
of reasons, and as I stated in my written testimony, not only because it was
wrong and an unfortunate racial profiling but I think to the extent that our
counter terrorism efforts, as we deal with the Middle East, are taking for
granted both the assistance that we could use or that we could galvanize from
the Arab countries and from Arab American and Muslims within this country.
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For
example, I mean in a very sort of efficacious way we have a problem with
translation of intelligence that we get from terrorist groups in foreign
countries. We just don't have enough people and every agency is going to tell
you that, that there is information still sitting around from the Millennium. We
need people who can translate that stuff into good English and to understandable
English, and generally those people will come from countries from the Middle
East.
I think that one of the problems with the
divide that exists between Arab and Muslim communities and our law enforcement
and national security communities is that neither group can sort of see common
ground on certain issues, and I think that it is an important thing for me to
say in terms of not just the fact that I am an Arab-American, but I do think
that our effectiveness as people within the national security world and people
who study terrorism is at a loss when we alienate certain
communities.
Given that, I want to talk about
three specific policy issues in light of the things that were testified today in
the changing nature of both state sponsorship and foreign terrorist
organizations, so first state sponsorship. As you know, our law provides for
actually three categories of countries in relation to terrorism. We have the
state sponsors of terrorism. Most of them are countries in the Middle East. We
have the rest of the countries that are not a
problem.
And then we have this third delineation
what we tend to call purgatory called the ''not cooperating fully'' designation.
Only one country has been put on the ''not cooperating fully'' designation,
which is Afghanistan, for the reason that this government doesn't want to
recognize and I think for legitimate reasons the Taliban is the governing body
or the legitimate governing body within Afghanistan. I think the evidence shows,
however, that in terms of state sponsorship we got a better case against
Afghanistan than we certainly do against Cuba or North Korea or maybe even Syria
these days.
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One
of the—in terms of the fluidity of state sponsorship and the terrorist
organizations, I, as I recommend in my written testimony, think we have to have
a much more fluid approach to state sponsorship of terrorism because we have
created this sort of dual world only. You know, you are either a state sponsor
and we are going to link you with Libya and Iran and Iraq or you are not. A lot
of countries that harbor terrorists, that support terrorists, that let finances
and money flow through them are sort of let off the
hook.
I think that is wrong. I think that not
cooperating fully is an appropriate designation. We recognize that there are
countries that are not as close to Iran and let us say the Sudan and Afghanistan
but certainly aren't like England or Israel in terms of their assistance on
counter terrorism. I think that this government needs to take, given the
changing nature of what is happening in the Arab states, a much more considerate
approach to what countries will go on and what countries will go off and
reconsider some of the countries that are on our state sponsors of
terrorism.
They shouldn't be on for political
reasons. They should be on because they do sponsor terrorism. I think
reconsideration, for example, as stated by Dr. Perlmutter, of Libya might be
appropriate at this stage or at least let these countries know what it will take
to get them off the list and let other countries know that they are very close
to getting on the ''not cooperating fully'' list. I think that we need a much
more sort of as a legal matter and the implications that fall from the law much
more fluid approach.
In terms of the foreign
terrorist organizations and the sort of diversity that exists within foreign
terrorist organizations, the changes that occur, the leadership changes and the
Internet and everything, the way we—the way the United States approaches foreign
terrorists and how we get at them beyond the intelligence side, I am talking
about the law enforcement and legal side, is through what is a foreign terrorist
organization listing. In 1996 this Congress passed this listing of organizations
that would be called foreign terrorist organizations, FTOs.
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A
lot flows from being called an FTO or having an affiliation with an FTO. You
can't get into this country, for example, at our borders if you are a member.
You can't give money to a foreign terrorist organization whether you know what
terrorism it is involved in or whether you are giving to some charity that
happens to be somewhere down the line run by or supported by an organization
that this country has deemed as terrorist.
I
think that there are a number of legitimate criticisms of the FTO designations,
not all of them coming from people who are concerned with the potential for
ethnic or political profiling within the list. The list is not comprehensive. It
doesn't involve—it doesn't include organizations like the real Irish Republican
Army (IRA), which is responsible for deaths, and there is a lot of criticism on
that end.
I think we can also criticize it or
sort of seek a more fluid approach to foreign terrorist organizations because it
is such a static listing. It only comes out two years. It can be—you can add
groups—the Secretary of State can add groups to the list over the course of the
two years but that has never occurred except for with Usama Bin Ladin's
organization after the Africa bombing. I think also given the nature of
terrorist groups, splinter groups, the changing naming of groups, a two-year
annual list is not going to cover the sort of threats that are occurring out
there.
I think that furthermore we need—if we
want to stop, which we do want to stop money flowing to foreign terrorist
organizations, as the Commission recommended and certainly as I believe, we need
to take a much broader approach to funding for terrorism. I think the FTO
listing probably focuses us too much on groups that we know of. We know Hamas.
We know Hezbollah. Four years ago they weren't on the list. Two years ago they
are. Hezbollah will probably be off in the next listing, my guess is.
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We
need an approach that will get at people who are giving money for terrorism and
people who are supporting terrorist organizations. That would involve money
laundering—using money laundering statutes, civil statutes, other criminal
statutes, and we need to take a much more broader approach, not just using the
Department of Justice but obviously the Department of Treasury, the information
the CIA may have.
I think that the government,
some of the testimony I have heard, is that the State Department has
spent—spends an inordinate amount of time compiling this list every two years.
That time might be better spent in terms of sharing and compiling and unifying
information about who is actually giving money to terrorism both in America and
abroad so that we can stop the flow. So my theme is sort of fluidity in terms of
the present laws that exist out there. I think a third important issue obviously
is immigration.
Immigration here is much bigger
than—the problems with our borders is much greater than terrorism. I wouldn't
even pretend to understand our immigration laws, but certainly when they involve
terrorism and the threat of terrorists coming to our countries, we need to take
a much closer look at what we are doing. The commission recommended a rather
controversial, although I would say a repetitive recommendation. We recommended
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) automate the information
it stores on people who come to this country to study from any country, not just
Arab countries, from any country.
It was a
proposal that this Congress passed four years ago but it received a lot of
criticisms. I think that those criticisms probably have less to do with the law.
Certainly automating information that is already required by law, you come into
this country whether it is on a marriage license, a student visa or work visa,
you have an obligation to retain that status. I don't think many people would
disagree with that. I think the concern that we have heard or that we heard from
a number of groups was the potential that this immigration policy could be used
in a discriminatory fashion given the sort of general aura that terrorism is
related to Arabs or Muslims.
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I
think that would be wrong. I think any evidence that it is applied in a
discriminatory fashion should be considered by this Congress but I do think that
it is important that we, not just this Committee, but sort of take a closer look
at our borders and how we can insure that people coming into this country who we
benefit from, no question about that in our schools and our environment, but
also who retain their status.
Present immigration
policy being used, and I will finish up with this, that has alienated not just
the Arab community here but I will say in talking to the government officials in
other countries including Jordan and Egypt, there are people being held here
based on secret evidence. That is well known. They are all, I think all, Muslims
or Arabs at this stage. They are being held here because of potential threats
that they are violating national security and neither they nor their counsel can
see it.
The evidence used against them, some of
them have been held up to three years. My understanding is that there are only
four people still being held by the INS in the Department of Justice. The impact
that that has had, however, and let me just state as an aside, the Commission
recommended that at least in terms of an effective and legitimate counter
terrorism policy that at the very least we have people, what we call clear
counsel, be permitted to see the evidence against
them.
The impact this is having though on our
allies in the Arab community is quite shocking when I talk to them. You are
really only talking about four cases. It is not a big deal. But I think that the
stereotyping and the effect of that process has sort of soured some relations
with people who are our allies, and, you know, not just our allies but want to
protect our interests and indeed Israel's interests. And so we should remember
that in any sort of legislative process that is undertaken as we address this
changing and yet historic threat. Thank you.
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[The
prepared statement of Ms. Kayyem can be found in the
Appendix.]
Mr. SAXTON. Well, thank you
very much, and we appreciate your testimony very much. Let me begin by posing a
question to and ask each of you if you would briefly comment. It has been
intimated by I guess each of you and from my background as well, we view
problems related to terrorism from a perspective that would involve the use of
terrorism for someone or some group of people who decided that they had an
objective to use terror to influence others
behavior.
And when we talk about terrorism, we
often think of terrorism against the United States, terrorism against Israel,
but you have all mentioned that the use of terror is common in other settings as
well. I am reminded as I hear you speak of use of terror against Mubarak, the
use of terror against the monarchy in Jordan, the use of terror perhaps against
the Fahd family in Saudi Arabia. Would you comment on this general theme where
terror is used against targets, if you will, or governments other than those we
normally talk about involving Israel and the United States? That is, other
venues, if you will.
Dr. MERARI. Am I
to start? Okay. Well, surely, Your Honor, it is of course true that terrorism
has been used and is being used against other countries other than Israel and
the United States. Actually, the State Department's annual publication, Veterans
of Global Terrorism, lists international terrorist attacks. They don't address
in that publication domestic terrorism, only incidents that are in some way
involving more than one country. Usually the perpetrators belong to one
nationality and the victims to another.
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But
in these series of publications it can be easily seen that most attacks, most
terrorist attacks, are not directed against the United States or Israel. I am
not sure what is the current situation now. A decade ago I think for quite a
while, about, I would say, two decades after 1968 when international terrorism
started to rise attacks against American property or citizens comprised
somewhere around 40% of all international terrorist attacks. I think currently
the percentage is lower and the United States does not take as much of the heat
in international terrorism.
But one has to
remember, of course, that international terrorism, the one that the State
Department is recording, comprises only a very small fraction of all global
terrorism. Most terrorism is domestic and most terrorism is directed against
local governments, domestic governments. For instance, in Latin America. In
Colombia I am told there are about 1,200 kidnappings in the region, 1,200
kidnappings each year in Colombia.
Mr.
SAXTON. What was the term you used?
1,200.
Dr. MERARI. Cases of
kidnapping.
Mr. SAXTON. Kidnapping. I
am sorry. Okay.
Dr. MERARI. About half
of them are perpetrated by terrorist groups, by politically motivated terrorist
groups. The others are just common criminal kidnappings. These are directed
against the government of Colombia or foreign nationalists that work there
because the organizations involved, Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) and
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Marxist organizations that
conspire to change the government.
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A
similar situation is, I think, in other countries. Even in Europe, western
European, the old, well-known groups like the German Bader Mein Hof the French
direct action group, the Belgian Combatant Communist sales, and so on. The
presently active group in Greece, very shady group known as the November 17
Revolutionary Group, that has carried out attacks against Americans
systematically over the years and recently against British
targets.
They are not attacking—these groups are
not attacking primarily the United States but they are after their own
governments so I think this observation is quite
correct.
Mr. SAXTON. Dr.
Perlmutter.
Dr. PERLMUTTER. As I said,
old terrorist organizations are political but there are other ways which they
can operate like economic terrorism, Internet. I mean we are totally dependent
today now on the electronic media. And they can disrupt, interfere into the
Pentagon, you know. They can go very far. They can screw up national security
problems and what not.
Take, for instance, the
rail system between New York City and Washington, D.C. You can discombobulate
and create accidents. Whether there are economic and psychological and efforts,
you know, to weaken or persuade people to think differently or to influence the
political leaders, they are politically motivated except as Dr. Merari correctly
said, you know, just gangster groups, you know, for purposes of soliciting
monies and what not. But on the whole there could be no terrorism without a
political purpose but they use subsidiary methods, you know.
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It
doesn't matter. What matters is the target is political. Whether it is domestic
or international, it certainly is clear that most are domestic but again
domestic terrorism like foreign policy, as you know, has an external aspect as
well. American foreign policy is based much on domestic issues. So, you know,
terrorists, you know, their domestic purposes can be achieved by influencing or
threatening or intimidating the international
system.
Ms. KAYYEM. I think that is
sort of especially true today in Iran. I think sort of the best example is that
you have a promising reform movement that has no control over the national
security forces, the more conservative forces, within Iran that is likely not
only sponsoring terrorism outside of Iran but is likely the sort of strongest
supporter of the assassinations we see going on of the major members of the
press and the reform movement, so it is a hard distinction. I think Iran is sort
of where we are seeing it happen right now.
Mr.
SAXTON. Let me ask one more question and then we will go to Mr.
Snyder. Let me just pose a statement and then you kind of react to it, if you
will. This was—it was very interesting that a relatively small percentage of
terrorist acts are carried out against those targets which we would consider the
two primary targets, Israel and the United States. It is encouraging. Let me
just ask. Let me pose this question.
During 1990
and 1991, we saw military activity take place in the Gulf and obviously the
world was able to get up each morning and watch those activities on CNN and it
convinced many of us that the military forces in the Middle East, at least at
that time and probably still today, cannot compete—cannot be competitive with
the western military forces and therefore those who have a political agenda and
who might try to carry forth that political agenda using the tool that we
referred to as conventional military force have to find another way to
accomplish their business and to what extent does terrorism fill that void.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Dr.
MERARI. Well, to a great extent I think actually terrorism has been
termed long ago repeatedly so the weapon of the week. If I can paraphrase
Klausowitz, the German strategic thinker, he said that war is the continuation
of politics by other means and I think one can very truly describe terrorism as
the continuation of war by other means, which also serves political rules, of
course, like war.
I was surprised, I must say,
that in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, we haven't seen more terrorism than we
actually did. We did see some, yes, but most of it was by just groups that
sympathized with Iraq in various places around the world that didn't really—did
not really go much out of their way to carry out an act which was demonstrative
basically to express their sympathy to Iraq.
Iraq
itself did not carry out much terrorism surprisingly. They did some. They tried.
I am not quite sure whether or not—it is a bit speculative but there has been
some nonconclusive evidence to support it. I am not quite sure whether or not
there was some Iraqi involvement in the World Trade Center bombing. Some
speculations have it that there was but other than that, not
much.
The interesting question is why, I think,
because one would expect more terrorism by Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. It
may be, I think, a deterrence. Iraqi fear of being caught red-handed in
sponsoring a terrorist attack against the United States would undoubtedly call
for a very severe retaliation. I cannot explain it otherwise. I brought with me
here a paper, a draft of a paper, that I have written on retaliation against
state sponsors of terrorism and I will leave it with the Committee, if I
may.
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It
kind of touches upon the complexities of retaliation against state sponsors of
terrorism but in this particular case I think this has been the reason for the
relative absence of terrorism after the Gulf
War.
[The information referred to can be found in
the Appendix.]
Mr. SAXTON. Dr.
Perlmutter.
Dr. PERLMUTTER. You can
see it in two ways. One of course, as I said in my statement, it would be an
auxiliary aspect of state foreign policy, security policy, Iran uses it for
mission purposes, and sometimes there could be regimes which are benign
authority in regimes. Groups can act independently in order to by international
terrorism to persuade the regime of their own fratricidal competitors of what
the purpose is. There is something we didn't mention. It just came to my mind
now, and I just throw it in because I hadn't thought of it
totally.
The group that we are sponsoring to
bring havoc to a regime of Saddam Hussein can be considered by Saddam Hussein as
a terrorist group. We want to terrorize the regime, don't we? We want to weaken
it whether by air or by internal infiltration because the Soviets used it
considerably throughout their career not always successfully. So there could be
what I call positive terrorism in the sense that the terrorism that is based by
forces who would become more stable and law abiding to overthrow a regime which
is brutal as Saddam Hussein. It just came to my mind as you asked me the
question of not thinking about that particular aspect that we support too in
many ways.
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Ms.
KAYYEM. Just quickly on the issue that Dr. Merari was talking about.
It is—in five of the seven countries on the state sponsors of terrorism list
there is no question they are developing weapons of mass destruction or sort of
attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is a puzzling question or
a grateful one, I think, that how come—how have those not been acquired by
terrorists or why is there still sort of a sharp line between the acquisition by
the terrorists.
I personally believe that if we
were to link a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack if there were to be one
with government sponsorship, I think the knowledge of our violent and massive
retaliation because the state keeps those states—even state sponsored terrorism
in line. If Libya or Iraq were to—any evidence that they were in any way
conspiring with any of these groups, so you get private groups who, you know,
for all of their money and all of their Ph.Ds., not to denigrate the deaths that
occurred in that case, but it was an unsuccessful
case.
Mr. SAXTON. Mr.
Snyder.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you for you all being here. This has been a very interesting
hour and a half. Dr., is it Kayyem?
Ms.
KAYYEM. Yes. It is Ms. Kayyem.
Mr.
SNYDER. Ms. Kayyem. Just one specific question. In your written
statement you recommended that the FDO statute which I think was passed in 1996
be reviewed in five years. Do you mean five years from now or five years from
1996?
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Ms.
KAYYEM. Five years from the commission recommendation. The reason why
that number, to be honest, was sort of picked out of a hat was I think it is
still an early call. I mean, right, it has only been five years from that time
of the statute or four and a half years. The statute would have existed for ten
years. As a prosecution matter, the Department of Justice has only done one
case, not a great record for four and a half years. I think there is a lot of
reasons for that. I think money cases are hard period. Any lawyer will—following
trails of money is hard.
In terms of the other
criminal prosecutions that flow from the FTO designations, for example, someone
who could be stopped at the border, not permitted in, expelled, or I guess
present law calls it removed, from the country if they are a member of an FTO,
to my knowledge, at least as a matter of public record, no one has—that has
never been utilized either.
I think group
listings—I understand what animated the FTO listing and I think it may have a
lot of beneficial political purposes but as a sort of effective law enforcement
purpose if we look at it as how do we want to get these guys, how do we want to
get the money, I think in my mind probably less so with other commissioners to
be fair, but in my mind I think the jury is still out but I think it is worth
reconsideration.
Mr. SNYDER. I wanted
to ask, I think all of you today have made comments either here or in your
written statements looking ahead to some prevention aspects. You talk about root
causes and things, and I want to ask about that. Mr. Saxton and I have talked
before about a meeting that some of us had with Prime Minister Barak last August
in which he said that in his view that a successful peace agreement, which I
think we are hopeful will come out of these meetings, is only the first step,
that what he envisions would need to occur is looking ahead 30 or 40 years, a
generation or two, where he could see Israel and Palestinians being like, he
used the example of France and Germany today.
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We
don't worry about France and Germany resurrecting aggressive war tendencies
towards each other because they are so economically dependent on each other and
probably for some other reasons cultural dependence too. Tell me what should
this Congress be doing, our Government be doing, to deal with things you
referred to when you were talking about these organizations that thrive in the
dust of economically deprived areas, I believe was your
phrase.
You make reference that they thrive in
areas of non-democratic areas. It seems to me that means we should do a better
job perhaps as policy makers in supporting efforts to develop sound economic
development around the world. Respond to that, if you would, as a panel. What
should we be doing to deal with these root
causes?
Dr. PERLMUTTER. First, I
totally agree with you that there is generational change, and we know that this
is very significant. Cohorts change, their minds. And there is a generational
change. They no longer remember the age of colonialism and early conflicts. They
are interested in economic development and interested in the Internet and what
not. They certainly realize it has to come to terms with peace with
Israel.
In terms of the very issue that I am
talking about, it is quite clear first concerning the peace process, when there
is an Israeli move in the peace process there is less terrorism but also
economic. How do you deal with that? This is a very serious problem. The
Palestinian authority has not become a democracy to say the least. And there are
still pockets of poverty in Gaza. You just have to visit there and see
that.
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This
is very difficult. How do you impose by international law or international
relations on a government to become more democratic and then, for instance, does
the money really go for that purpose. We know from studies in Africa and other
places that the money went to the pockets of the kleptocrats. And it is a very,
very sensitive issue for which we have no permissive to bring the change.
Certainly, peace is important. That is only one. The most important thing is
change of government and change of government must be turned on domestic. It
cannot deposit outside.
And that is going to
linger on. There is no question about it because it is lingering on. Why do you
think the Egyptian—during the small earthquake that took place in Egypt where
did the people go? They went to the Mohammed Mustafa Hospital, which is owned by
the Muslim Brotherhood and they didn't get any services from the Egyptian
government.
The Egyptian government still doesn't
give services to its poor and that is a serious business that has been there for
a long time. I am more leery of intervention but I would put self restrictions
if I could on foreign aid and certain policing of foreign aid to see that the
money goes to the right places at least. That has not demonstrated itself yet in
the Palestinian authority, and we are familiar with the cases of corruption and
Arafat signs every check I think above $100,000 and so forth. He keeps all the
finances himself.
Things are changing. I have no
answer as a student of this area. I have no specific answer to the issue of
poverty because it is a domestic issue and it is a political issue. In the
democratic political system you have a middle class which is fundamental. In
non-democratic political systems the middle class is weak and therefore the
other forces which dominate society—and they are not interested in solving the
problems of the poor.
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Ms.
KAYYEM. I have nothing to add to
that.
Dr. MERARI. Okay. We don't know
enough about—talking about in general, we don't know enough about—terrorism is a
phenomenon. There have been many studies and so on but we are still learning. I
think, however, it is safe to say that terrorism is not a cause. Terrorism is an
instrument. It is a form of struggle. It is an illegitimate form of struggle for
sure. But it is just a form of struggle, and it is violence that appears where
there are acute conflicts like all forms of violence and the acute conflicts may
arise out of a variety of problems, political disagreements, economic hardships,
religious motivations, what have you.
And we see
indeed that terrorism appears against a backdrop of a variety of different
conditions in various places around the globe. We cannot possibly address all
these hardships that bring about the will of certain groups of people to engage
in this illegitimate form of violence to correct what they see as grievances, to
promote their interests. We cannot possibly address all
these.
I would say that there are two ways, two
general ways, to cope with—your question, sir, was very broad. Two general ways.
One addresses the illegitimacy aspect of terrorism as a form of struggle and for
that I think much has been done. Much more can be done in the line of
sanctioning states that sponsor such groups, using the legal system, domestic
legal systems to make sure that the people understand that they cannot resort to
this form of conflict of improving their interests without paying a high cost,
improving international cooperation and so on.
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This
is just addressing the form of struggle, not the grievances. But you, sir, asked
about addressing the root causes. I am afraid there is no general answer to
that. I think that, yes, I agree with my colleagues here that in the Middle East
in particular, and I understand that today the Middle East isn't the focus,
economic hardships are very important as a backdrop for terrorism. In the Gaza
Strip I think there is more than 30%
unemployment.
Mr. SNYDER. The phrase
pockets of poverty was used in Gaza when I was there years ago. I would say it
is a big pocket.
Dr. MERARI. Yeah, I
was a bit surprised by the term pockets actually. I mean it is one big pocket.
It used to be 40%. I am told that now it is a bit less than that but it is
certainly more than 30% unemployment in Gaza and about 16%, I think, in the West
Bank, which is quite high. Now in Egypt too there is a very high rate of
unemployment. Yes, there is some connection to so-called Afghani Connection
between those Islamic militants that served in the Afghani war against the
USSR.
But basically there is Islamic terrorism in
Egypt not because of Bin Ladin's influence but because there are domestic,
primarily economic problems in Egypt. Palestinian terrorism is a different
story. It is not only based on economic difficulties but primarily on
nationalist sentiments, hatred to Israel and so on but still there. The economic
situation does indeed, in my view, influence the will of people to support Hamas
exactly like Dr. Perlmutter's description.
Hamas
attraction for the Palestinian population to a large extent is because they have
been able to establish clinics in which they give free medical treatment,
kindergartens. They distribute food and so on. Hezbollah's attraction for the
Lebanese in South Lebanon is based on the same thing, community service. Now
Hezbollah does it with donations. Donations are huge money flow from Iran
variously estimated at between $60 million and $120 million a year. It is
Iranian money that makes Hezbollah popular in South Lebanon to a large
extent.
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Hamas
does it in other ways. Gets the money, some contributions here in the United
States, some in the Gulf countries, but much of these organizations' popularity
is linked to the economic situation in their countries and to these
organizations', radical organizations, ability to provide community service to
needy populations.
Dr. PERLMUTTER. I
just wanted to add one thing about—it is true that pockets of poverty, large and
small, but the leaders of the terrorist organizations, western educated, middle
class, etc., have a different fish to fry and they will mobilize wherever they
can mobilize. If you resolve the economic problem you haven't resolved the
nationalist aspect of terrorism.
Mr.
SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Taylor.
Mr.
TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for being here.
Kayyem, is that how you say it?
Ms.
KAYYEM. Ms. Kayyem.
Mr.
TAYLOR. Ms. Kayyem, I have got to admit, I very much did not hear you
say it but very much enjoyed reading your remarks. I happen to remember the
Oklahoma City. I was fortunate enough to dodge the press that day but I do
remember many of my colleagues, as you said, immediately jumping to the
conclusion it must be Middle Eastern terrorists. We learned, unfortunately, that
was not the case.
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But
with those prejudices in mind, I have got to admit that even ten years later a
great deal of discomfort with the very unfortunate incident between the
Vincennes and the Iranian air bus. And it was brought back to my attention last
week, I believe, there was a special on one of the educational channels. I am
curious what the long-term implications of that one incident are. Are you
familiar when the cruiser shot down the Iranian air bus as they were engaged in
a surface action against Iranian small
boats?
What are the long-term, if any,
implications of that? I am trying to think of this from the American point of
view. Remember the Alamo. Remember the Maine. I just—I am curious what the
Middle Eastern reaction to that was because I could certainly imagine what the
American reaction would be had the tables been
turned.
Ms. KAYYEM. You talk to Arabs
in the Middle East, not Arab-Americans or Muslim-Americans, that particular
incident or any incident, it is clear and just given the conversation today that
our terrorism is another man's freedom struggle and it certainly was true with
the African National Congress (ANC). I mean that group under any definition of
terrorism, it would—you know, Nelson Mandela was a terrorist under any political
science definition. Nonetheless, obviously there was a tremendous amount of
support for his actions.
I think within the Arab
communities in the Middle East any retaliation in response to that, and I should
be careful, but in terms of that specific incident or any incident is viewed as
potentially a military action and not terrorism as the literature from the
Middle East often views the bombing of the Marines in Beirut as that. That is
not—in our mind that is viewed—in the United States that is viewed as an act of
terrorism.
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Mr.
TAYLOR. If I am not mistaken, that was almost two weeks to the
day.
Ms. KAYYEM. Yes.
Yes.
Mr. TAYLOR. The shoot down
occurred first and the bombing in the barracks was almost two weeks to the day
afterwards.
Ms. KAYYEM. Yeah, I think
that—
Mr. TAYLOR. At the time, and
again I am asking this from a historical perspective, at the time did the group
that bombed the Marines, did they mention that as being in retaliation? I don't
recall that.
Dr. MERARI.
No.
Ms. KAYYEM.
No.
Dr. MERARI. If I may intervene.
The bombing of the Marine barracks, if I am not mistaken, was October 23, 1983.
The downing—the suicide bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, 1983, October,
1983. The shooting down of the Iranian air bus by the Vincennes American cruiser
I think it was, was in July, 1988.
Mr.
TAYLOR. But if I am not mistaken within two weeks of the shooting
down there was an incident somewhere—
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Dr.
PERLMUTTER. Lockerbie.
Dr.
MERARI. No, no, no. Lockerbie was
in—
Dr. PERLMUTTER.
Absolutely.
Dr. MERARI. December, the
same year, December, 1988, and it is quite possible,
sir.
Mr. TAYLOR. But did any group
ever say this was done for that?
Dr.
MERARI. No.
Ms. KAYYEM.
No.
Mr. TAYLOR. I have never heard
that.
Dr. MERARI. No, there were no
claims, no real claims of responsibility for
Lockerbie.
Mr. TAYLOR. Were there ever
any reasonably solid evidence that could point to the fact that the Iranian air
bus might have actually had hostile
intentions?
Dr. MERARI. Yes.
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Mr.
TAYLOR. There was.
Dr.
MERARI. There was—Israeli intelligence sources have maintained—in
deference to American intelligence have from the start maintained that most
likely perpetrators of the Lockerbie bombing, Pan Am 103, that is, over
Lockerbie, on I think December 21, 1988, was done by Jibril's group, most
likely, Jibril Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) General
Command on Iranian invitation or Iranian contract, so to speak. There were
indications that Jibril's persons, members of his organization, a cell of
Jibril, which acted in Germany, were planning to bomb a series of airliners in
mid-air.
These people were in contact, that is
according to Israeli and German intelligence, were in contact also with Iranian
agents. They were arrested. This Jibril group were arrested in Germany by the
German indiscriminate German parlor of the FBI, in October, 1988, two months
before Lockerbie. Their bomb maker, a guy by the name of Khreisat, admitted to
the German authorities that he had made five bombs designed to explode onboard
airliners in mid-flight.
However, the Germans
only found four bombs. Khreisat himself, the bomb maker, was released shortly
after his arrest for strange reasons. Some possible speculations, never proven
in court, but still some I think intelligence officers believed that the fifth
bomb exploded onboard Lockerbie—onboard Pan Am
103.
Ms. KAYYEM. That is different
than our—I mean obviously that is different than where our intelligence in at
least the international case is. Viewing Israeli's intelligence perspective
obviously focuses on Libya. I think, however, the interesting aspect of that
case with Pan Am 103 is here you have two guys who if directed by the Libyan
government to do what they did with Pan Am 103, and if found guilty by this
court is probably going to sort of implicitly exonerate the Libyan government
because we are going to put them behind bars.
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And
I think that is one of the difficulties with in some ways the law enforcement
approach which is our approach to terrorism. It is not clear if these guys are
found guilty, if the two of them are found guilty, what then happens if there is
evidence of state sponsorship.
Mr.
TAYLOR. I phrased my question poorly so I will ask it again. Was
there ever any evidence that the Iranian air bus had hostile intentions against
the Vincennes? Since you are the experts, have you ever been aware of anything
along those lines?
Dr. MERARI. No. It
was a civilian airliner. However, I think the captain of the Vincennes bona fide
believed that it was an enemy aircraft on an attack mission and he acted on his
orders and real belief that this was the case. It was a terrible mistake, of
course. But prior to that, American ships in the Gulf at the time were
attacked—had been attacked by Iranian seacraft, and they were afraid of Iranian
attack from the air as well.
It was a time of
hostile activity so—by the way, the Iranians did take a different type of
revenge, I think, at least attempted to, after the shooting down of the Iranian
air bus. Some months later, I don't remember now the exact date, but some months
after the shooting down of the Iranian air bus the wife of the captain of the
Vincennes had her car, her van, I think, booby trapped in San Diego, California
and the general belief is that this was the act of Iranian agents in
revenge.
Dr. PERLMUTTER. There is a
point that should be made. The exacerbation of relationship between United
States and Iran not only because of the hostages but remember we played a key
role in supporting Iraq against Iran. In fact, we saved Iraq. So the
Iranians—these organizations can sometimes work on their own by believing that
they will be perceived to do the job of the governments. Sometimes they are not
necessarily loyal to one group or another but there is Iranian involvement, in
my view, by the definition of the Iranian perception of the United States before
the Gulf War.
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I
mean we have armed Saddam Hussein. We have created Saddam Hussein. We have saved
Saddam Hussein in our intervention. That left an indelible mark in the Iranian
mind as much as we remember the hostages. So I wouldn't just say that Iran is
not directly or indirectly involved but nevertheless it was a mistake but not in
my view—if I would be the judge I would say contextually it isn't because in
view of what the Iranian hostilities are then I would not punish severely the
particular captain.
Mr. TAYLOR. I was
curious what the long-term implications were of that incident. I probably would
have made the mistake the captain made.
Mr.
SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. These buzzers that you hear are about
a warning of a series of votes upcoming, and it will probably take us a half
hour or more so I think what we will do is just thank you for being here this
morning. This series of hearings that this panel is conducting are designed to
help us as members of Congress understand the general subject of terrorism and
the nature of the subject, and also to foster a public dialogue that interested
members of the United States citizenry can view if they wish in order to help
our society further understand this subject.
And
you have made a significant contribution in that regard today and we thank you
very much for being with us, and we look forward to working with you in the
future. Thank you for being here. We appreciate it very much. The panel stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Panel
was adjourned.]
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A
P P E N D I X
July 13, 2000
[This information is
pending.]